(y) [Ty (Bxy Axy)] = (y) [Ty (~Axy ~Bxy)] is explained as follows:
(y)	-- there is a y such that
Ty	-- y is a year-round temperature range
	-- and
Bxy	-- x is behaviorally active throughout y
	-- goes between a clause beginning with if and a following clause beginning with then
Axy	-- x is in an animal adapted to y
	-- is equivalent to
~	-- not

Appendix II
The basic structure requirement is an offshoot of the linguistic emphasis in 20^th century philosophy and logic. Embedded in ‘entity x has a property related to an environmental condition’ is a principle of predication, wherein such an entity is the subject of a sentence of which the rest is the predicate. Corresponding to ‘Alice loves Bill’ or ‘Alice has lovingness for Bill’ is ‘x is adapted to y’ or ‘x has adaptedness to y’. The property of lovingness is a part of Alice and is separated off by predication. Likewise the property of adaptedness is separated off from the organism of which it is a part – by predication, the unavoidable feature of language. Other beings have one-word sentences (the bark of a dog or song of a bird), but we have a complete language, with many-worded subject-predicate sentences. And the subjective structure of our sentences determines the external structure of the world as particular entities composed of properties, in the realist’s view.

Appendix III
The two-thousand–year-old debate about the existence of universals began with Plato (Jowett). Plato’s words from the Parmenides are: “great things become great, because they partake of greatness, and just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty”. But justice and beauty cannot be reduced to just and beautiful things for the following reason.

Frank Jackson (1977) provides an “apparently decisive” objection to the reduction of properties to particulars. “Everything red is both shaped and extended, but red is neither a shape nor an extension.” “This is not to deny that ‘Red is a color’ entails that necessarily everything red is coloured. But the former says more than the latter. If red’s being a colour were nothing more than a matter of every red thing necessarily being coloured, then red’s being a shape and an extension would be nothing more than the fact that necessarily every red thing is shaped and extended. And red is not a shape and not an extension. It seems that ‘Red is a colour’ says, as the realist maintains, something about red not reducible to something about red things.” These are Jackson’s important words. And by analogy justice and beauty are not reducible to just and beautiful things.

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