But not forgetting the problem of what a trait is, what T is, what T is when O has T, Grant (1963, p. 95) gives a well crafted factual presentation: “The webbed feet of a duck set toward the rear of the body represent an adaptation for swimming; the strong sharp talons of an owl are an adaptation for clutching prey; the opposable front and rear toes of a warbler are an adaptation for perching on branches”, wherein duck O has webbed feet T and webbed feet T are (is) advantageous to duck O, which is to say, is adaptive in environment E, and, more cogently, is adapted to environment E. But what is trait T, webbed feet? This trait and the other two traits are, each, an adaptation.

Thus we have worked from the factual term adapted – true of many organisms – and its sister term adaptive – showing a tendency to become in fact true of many organisms – we have worked from these terms to the term adaptation. One adaptation is one entity, whereas adapted is true of many entities But to continue, Barash (1977, pp. 57-62) gives four traits for three species of marmots in North America. The eastern woodchuck is adapted to a low elevation habitat and a long growing season and has these four traits, these four adaptations: dispersal of young at the end of the first year, sexual maturation during the second year, annual reproduction, solitary and aggressive social system. The Olympic marmot, by contrast, is adapted to a high elevation habitat and a short growing season and has these four traits, these four adaptations: dispersal of young at the third year, sexual maturation in the fourth year, biennial reproduction, colonial and tolerant social system. The yellow bellied marmot is intermediate in habitat and traits. It is probable that Barash would not be interested in the switch from ‘is’ to ‘has’, from something is adapted to something else, x is adapted to y, to something has an adaptation, x has y and y is an adaptation. What interests Barash is the evolutionary change with the changing habitats. The traits as a bundle for each species are considered adaptive, the bundle for each species maximizing the fitness of each species – for throughout his book on sociobiology adaptive and maximizing fitness are regularly equated. The issue, one can vaguely discern, is not that there is some process of evolutionary change but that there is the accomplished fact of evolution in the three bundles of traits being adapted to three different environments, in the three species being adapted to three different environments.

But process is the central issue in Lewontin’s (1978) large scale portrayal when he says “the wholesale reconstruction of a reptile to make a bird is considered a process of major adaptation by which birds solved the problem of flight”. This wholesale reconstruction of a reptile includes the four traits or properties common to all birds: hollow, lightweight bone, increased size of sternum, change in integument to feathers for flight and insulation, and increased forelimb. With the appearance of these traits evolution, in personified language, made birds adapted to flight – solved the problem of flight, metaphorically speaking.

The accomplished fact of evolution and the process of evolution are expressed in another way (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p. 68). “All extant species, for a very large part of their evolutionary histories, have neither increased nor decreased in number and range….. At the same time, the species is evolving, changing its morphology, physiology, and behavior. The problem is how a species can be at all times both adapting and adapted.” A point well taken.

But now it is apparent what is wrong. The vista presented in the last three paragraphs is so unremittingly positive. It just can’t be right. But two more cases are the following.

Let us consider the account of Kricher and Morrison (1989, pp. 141-143). They say that in the eastern woodchuck of the U.S.A., “the ability to hibernate…..is an adaptation”. The grey squirrel is pointed out because it lacks this adaptation. They want us to believe, without a shred of evidence, that “In the past, probably millions of years ago, woodchuck ancestors possessing the ability…..to sleep deeply for at least part of the winter, were the ones that survived best….and left most offspring in the overall wood-chuck population.” They are concerned of course with the origin of an adaptation. Here the concern, instead, is the double question: Is the woodchuck adapted because it hibernates and is the squirrel not adapted because it does not hibernate? It is baffling that such an obvious contrast is not made. What they say is “an adaptation in one species is never guaranteed to evolve in all species, even if it would be advantageous.”

A similar line of thinking is from Seger and Stubblefield (1996, pp. 99-102). A frequency distribution of clutch sizes for nearly 4500 clutches of great tits (Parus major) in Wytham Wood near Oxford (England) showed that “the most productive clutch is 12 but the commonest clutches are 8 and 9. Parents therefore appear to lay smaller clutches, on average, than those that would maximize their fitness.” If “maximize their fitness” is interpreted to mean “best adapted,” then it would seem that the commonest clutches are not the best adapted. But the authors’ effort is to explain both statistically and experimentally why the tits did not maximize their fitness. Their effort is to explain away the tits’ not being best adapted. Their thinking is confused.

This discussion has brought forward several features. Brandon provides if-then and if-and-only-if structure; these are logical structures. Munson provides trait; a trait is a property, a characteristic, a universal. Both Brandon and Munson relate the trait, the property, of being adapted to the environment. Instances of the property of being adapted are given by Grant: the webbed feet of a duck, the talons of an owl, the opposable toes of a warbler are instances, examples of adaptedness (the property of being adapted). Finally the process and the accomplished fact of being adapted are important aspects of evolution for Barash, Lewontin, and Levins and Lewontin.

In all of these treatments only affirmation of adapted, of adaptedness is considered, a stark fault. In what follows cases involving both affirmation and denial of adaptedness will be presented first, and then cases involving only the affirmation of adaptedness will be presented second. The treatments just presented seem only to get at the structure of adaptation and to get at it in a rather piece-meal and unintegrated way. In what follows structure will be emphasized, a very integrated structure. This structure will be seen to permeate the content of adaptation.

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